Are university affairs ever open to Charter scrutiny, particularly in matters of student discipline? This was one of the key questions raised, though not conclusively decided, in Pridgen v University of Calgary. This question, in an era of political polarization and mass mobilization on university campuses, directly affects Canada’s roughly two million post-secondary students. The authors argue that despite the Alberta Court of Appeal’s well-reasoned section 32 analysis, the decision’s relative legal and public obscurity, coupled with the broad individual and institutional interests at stake in deciding this question, suggest a need for the Supreme Court of Canada to rectify its ambiguous interpretation of section 32 in McKinney v University of Guelph. This paper attempts to demonstrate an interpretive cleavage in section 32 jurisprudence surrounding universities’ exercise of disciplinary powers by contrasting the opinions expressed within the Pridgen ABCA case and the narrow application of section 32 by other courts across the country, particularly in Ontario.