Since the advent of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the Supreme Court of Canada has frequently considered what investigative techniques employed by police are disreputable to the justice system at large. The technique of most importance is the constitutional provision that allows the judiciary to exclude evidence based on such considerations—section 24(2) of the Charter. Since establishing the system’s repute is part of the formal legal test for admissibility of improperly obtained evidence, judges typically perform a mental exercise, imagining what the “reasonable person” would find acceptable.

The aim of this study is to compare the outcomes of five of the Supreme Court of Canada’s landmark section 24(2) analyses with public opinion as to when evidence is justly excluded from criminal trials. Accordingly, this study includes a survey conducted in 2011 to more fully understand what evidence-gathering measures are truly disreputable in the eyes of the Canadian citizenry. The survey was designed and administered for a graduate research paper in Criminology and Criminal Justice Policy at the University of Guelph. The survey is intended to capture any variance or overlap between the views of a sample of ordinary citizens and the Supreme Court of Canada’s judgments on evidence exclusion.

Matthew Wolfson, “Public Opinion and Excluding Evidence Under Section 24(2) of the Charter: A Recent Poll” (PDF)

“We are witnessing increasing marginalization, the deepening of stereotypes and the exiling of the poor from our political community” with the enactment of the Safe Streets Act. The indigent are increasingly construed as dangerous and less deserving members of society, and the public and private spaces of these individuals have been shrinking as a result. In 1999, the Safe Streets Act came into force in the province of Ontario. British Columbia passed similar legislation in 2004. The Safe Streets Act targets one of the most vulnerable groups in society, exacerbating their disadvantaged position. The legislation also offends the basic tenets underlying the constitutional framework of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, specifically sections 7, 12, and 15, and therefore should be struck down. Alternatively, amendments could remove the unconstitutional or problematic provisions.

Amy Mintah, “Excluding the Indigent from the Public Sphere” (PDF)

Are university affairs ever open to Charter scrutiny, particularly in matters of student discipline? This was one of the key questions raised, though not conclusively decided, in Pridgen v University of Calgary. This question, in an era of political polarization and mass mobilization on university campuses, directly affects Canada’s roughly two million post-secondary students. The authors argue that despite the Alberta Court of Appeal’s well-reasoned section 32 analysis, the decision’s relative legal and public obscurity, coupled with the broad individual and institutional interests at stake in deciding this question, suggest a need for the Supreme Court of Canada to rectify its ambiguous interpretation of section 32 in McKinney v University of Guelph. This paper attempts to demonstrate an interpretive cleavage in section 32 jurisprudence surrounding universities’ exercise of disciplinary powers by contrasting the opinions expressed within the Pridgen ABCA case and the narrow application of section 32 by other courts across the country, particularly in Ontario.

Danielle Cornacchia & Mustafa Farooq, “Status Change: Addressing Section 32 of the Charter, University Disciplinary Powers, and the Supreme Court in Light of Pridgen v University of Calgary”